Planning – third party appeal against the decision of the Minister
to grant planning permission.
[2013]JRC022
Royal Court
(Samedi)
28 January 2013
Before :
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J. A. Clyde-Smith, Commissioner, and Jurats
Marett-Crosby and Crill.
|
Between
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Sarah Craig Ferguson
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Appellant
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And
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The Minister for Planning and Environment
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Respondent
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And
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Ruette Pinel Limited
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Applicant
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The Appellant appeared in person.
Mr D. Mills for the Respondent.
Advocate M. T. Jowitt for the Applicant.
judgment
the commissioner:
1.
This is a
third party appeal under the modified procedure brought by the appellant under
Article 114 of the Planning and Building (Jersey) Law 2002 (“the
Planning Law”) against the decision of the respondent (“the
Minister”) to grant planning permission in respect of land at Zanzibar,
Le Mont Sohier, in the parish of St Brelade (“the site”).
2.
The site
is located to the south of Mont Sohier in the parish St Brelade adjacent to St
Brelade’s Bay. The site is
surrounded on three sides by residential properties with views to the south
over to the beach and sea. The
existing building on the site is unoccupied and was previously used as a
restaurant. To the north of the
site is a building fronting Mont Sohier known as Mimosa Cottage which is a
Potential Listed Building. The
appellant’s property, known as Soleil D’Hiver is to the north-east
of the site. The site slopes from
north to south and tapers in width from north to south measuring approximately
25 metres at its northern part and approximately 12 metres at its southern
part. The site area is
approximately 0.48 acres.
3.
This is,
in effect, the third application submitted by the applicant for the development
of the site. The first application,
submitted on 14th September, 2010, was for the demolition of the
existing restaurant building, the construction of a new dwelling and the
refurbishment of Mimosa Cottage. No
issues arise over the refurbishment of Mimosa Cottage and we are therefore
concerned in this judgment with the remainder of the site. The proposed new building at 22,000
square feet occupied the majority of the site and was, in the words of the
department’s architect, designed “as an uncompromising, iconic contemporary house” set over
three floors with sequentially arranged internal spaces from the entrance to
the north to the beach front to the south.
In the view of the Planning Department in its report of 12th
November, 2010, the size and siting of the proposed dwelling and restricted
plot width gave the impression that the development was shoehorned into a site
that is too small to comfortably accommodate it. Whilst acknowledging that the
architecture of the proposed dwelling was innovative and competent, maximising
potential for views out to sea from almost every element of the new building, the
report stated that:-
“The grain and general
style of development along this part of St Brelade’s Bay is of a more
intimate form, with relatively modest units set within reasonable curtilages
with no single property standing out from its neighbours.”
4.
The report
concluded that the proposed dwelling would present a strong dominant image,
particularly when viewed from the seaward side and also in more distant views
from the western and eastern arms of the Bay and the Planning Department did
not consider the size and form of the development to be appropriate in this
particular site within the sensitive St Brelade’s Bay area. Furthermore, there were issues relating
to the diminution of amenity and impact upon the character and setting of
Mimosa Cottage.
5.
On 26th
November, 2010, the application was refused for the following reasons:-
“1. The
proposal represents an over-development of the site with the size, bulk and
layout within a restricted plot width being likely to unreasonably affect the
character and amenity of the area contrary to the provisions of Policies G2,
G3, G15 and H8 of the Jersey Island Plan, 2002.
2. The proposed development
is likely to have an unreasonable impact on the amenities of nearby residents
by virtue of overlooking and potential disturbance from the elevated roof
terraces and by presenting an overbearing appearance. The proposal is, therefore, considered
to be contrary to the provisions of Policies G2 and H8 of the Jersey Island
Plan, 2002.
3. The proposed development
is likely to result in the consolidation of built development over natural
vegetation and prevention of substantial planting within the site. Accordingly, the proposal fails to
comply with the provisions of Policy BE10 of the Jersey Island Plan, 2002.
4. The proposal does not
contain sufficient information against which the impact on the fabric and
appearance of the Registered structure, Mimosa, can be assessed and the
proposal, therefore, fails to comply with the provisions of Policy G14 of the
Jersey Island Plan, 2002.”
6.
The second
application was submitted on 15th March, 2011, accompanied by a design
statement and model. The proposed
new building was of similar modern design but had been scaled down by inter alia the omission of the third
storey, the lowering of the site by some 3.2 metres, setting the building back
from the promenade aligning it with the buildings on either side and the
removal of the outside terraces that overlooked the neighbours. It would now comprise approximately
18,500 square feet, just under 50% of which would be underground.
7.
According
to the Planning Department’s report of 24th May, 2011, the
Architecture Commission, sitting on 4th April, 2011, considered this
revised scheme a good response to the refusal of the earlier scheme. The Commission commended the design and
the Planning Department’s architect was satisfied that the design reached
the high standard required by Policy G3 of the 2002 Island Plan. The Planning Department recommended
approval concluding as follows:-
“Summary/Conclusion
The architecture of the
proposed dwelling is innovative and competent, maximising the potential for
views out to sea while minimising the building’s impact when viewed from
the road or promenade/beach. The
bespoke nature of the proposal pays due regard to the amenities of neighbouring
residents and should not result in an unreasonable degree of overlooking or
general loss of privacy.
Although the overall structure
remains relatively large, the majority of the building’s bulk is along
its side flanks and not on the more visible northern and southern elevations.
The series of bold, rectangular
volumes, set in a staggered pattern along the site axis, presents a strong,
dominant form which was commended by the Architecture Commission.”
8.
The
processing of the second application is described in detail in Ruette Pinel
Farm Limited-v-Minister for Planning and Environment [2012] JRC 008 which
we will refer to as “the Ruette Judgment”. In short, although the Minister (at the
time) regarded the scheme as “a fabulous piece of architecture” for
a site on which inevitably a significant house would ultimately be constructed,
he refused the application at the public meeting because of what he described
as the level of political opposition expressed by a number of politicians,
although different reasons were given in the formal notice that was
subsequently issued. The Court
found that there had been serious procedural irregularities such that the
decision could not stand, which can be summarised as follows:-
(i)
It was wrong
in principle for the Minister to have had private meetings with the developer,
as occurred in this case, prior to the application being submitted and to give
advice and having done so and by sitting at the public hearing there was a real
risk that he had taken into account non-planning considerations.
(ii) It was not a material consideration for the
purposes of Article 19 of the Planning Law that representations had been made
by politicians as opposed to other members of the public.
(iii) The statement contained in the Planning
Department’s report for the first application that “the grain and general style of development
along this part of St Brelade’s Bay is of a more intimate form, with
relatively modest units set within reasonable curtilages with no single property
standing out from its neighbours.” – which appeared to the
Court to be significant – had been omitted from the Planning
Department’s report for the second application but included in the formal
reasons given for the refusal. Quoting
from the judgment of Bailhache, Deputy Bailiff, at paragraph 39:-
“If it were the case here
– and we make no finding because we have not heard all the evidence
directly – that a planning recommendation to the Minister was tailored in
advance to what the Minister wanted to decide or that reasons for the
ministerial decision were dressed up after the event to give an appearance of
legitimacy, that would be wholly unacceptable conduct by officials.”
9.
The formal
notice dated 10th June, 2011, is in the following terms:-
“1. The
proposal represents an unacceptable scale and mass of development within a
restricted plot width being likely to unreasonably affect the character and
amenity of the area. The proposed
dwelling would fill a significant proportion of the site, leaving very little
space between the dwelling and the site boundaries, thereby substantially
altering the form and urban grain of this part of St Brelade’s Bay which
retains a loose and relatively intimate scale and grain of development. The Department considers that the
proposal is, therefore, contrary to the provisions of Policies G2, G3, G15 and
H8 of the Jersey Island Plan, 2002.
2. The proposed development
is likely to have an unreasonable impact on the amenities of nearby residents
by virtue of overlooking and by presenting an overbearing appearance. The proposal is, therefore, considered
to be contrary to the provisions of policies G2 and H8 of the Jersey Island
Plan, 2002.
3. On the Jersey Island Plan,
2002, the site lies within the Green Backdrop Zone and it is considered that
the scale and mass of the proposed building development relative to open space
and natural vegetation on this prominent site in the Bay would unreasonably
harm the character and amenity of the area and would be contrary to the provisions
of Policy BE10 of the Island Plan.”
10. The Court went on to consider the merits of the
application on the basis that the reasons were those set out in the formal
notice. This exercise by the Court
is of importance to the decision we have to make because the views expressed by
the Court have guided the process subsequently. We therefore set out the relevant
section of the judgment in full: -
“48. If this particular refusal of permission had been
firmly grounded in the reasons which are set out in the notice of refusal, we
would not have allowed the appeal on the ground that the Minister’s
decision was unreasonable. In our
judgment, a decision to refuse this particular application – and we emphasise
we are not saying that the Minister ought to refuse it, because that is
entirely a matter for him – can be justified by the reasons which are
contained in the formal notice of refusal dated 10th June, 2011. We have reached that conclusion because
we have had regard to all the papers put before us including the artist’s
impression of what the proposed building would look like, and the model which
has been prepared. In our view, a
conclusion by the Minister – if he were to make it and that is entirely a
matter for him – that the proposed development is of a size and mass
which is out of proportion to the size of the site and the area, and in effect
amounts to an over-development of the site, would fall within the parameters of
reasonable decision taken by a Minister charged under the Law with a function of
taking a decision. We do not say
that the proposed building is too big or that the mass is too great or that
this is an over-development of the site but we do say that it is not
unreasonable to reach that view, were the Minister to reach it.
49. We
think it would be helpful also to put the matter the other way round. If the Minister had granted the
application and we were dealing with an appeal by third parties, the question
would be whether the Minister’s decision to grant the application would
be unreasonable in all the circumstances of the case having regard to the legal
tests which we have mentioned. In
our judgment this is a closer call, and we prefer not to express any firm
conclusion on it. But there is no
doubt that the proposed building is very dominating of the area. There is in our view no doubt that the
parking provision which has been made is surprisingly little, particularly if
that is to be shared with Mimosa Cottage.
We note that an 18,000 square foot house taking up the entirety of this
site, or very nearly, would make a huge impact on the area.
50. The
vibrancy of the objections in this case which we are told included one or more
of the neighbours taking advice as to whether or not to join in the appeal
leads us to think that if we were to express no view on the merits, further
costly and potentially wasteful appeals might be made. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, it is
for the applicant to determine whether the existing application is the
application it wishes to have considered by the Minister or whether it wishes
to make further revisions to accommodate any of the comments which are made in
this judgment.
51. In
the light of the fact that the Minister is a corporation sole and in the light
of the former Senator Cohen’s approval of the modernity and style of the
design, supported as it was by the Jersey Architecture Commission and the
States architect, we would be surprised if design and modernity were to be a
feature in any objections which are made in the future, and we think it might
be difficult to justify as reasonable any refusal of permission based on these
grounds particularly because we do not understand the notice of refusal of 10th
June to set out these grounds as relevant to the refusal at that time.
52. Of
course, any fresh consideration of an application is going to take place having
regard to the Island Plan approved in 2011 rather than the Island Plan of 2002
and we cannot be sure what differences, if any, between the two plans might be
significant as we have not been addressed on it, although we are told by the
appellant that there are no changes of significance to this application. However, we would be surprised if
objections relevant to the policies underlining the Green Backdrop Zone in the
2002 Plan would lead to any refusal of permission, and it might well be that it
would be unreasonable to view the application which was refused in June 2010 as
being contrary to the provisions of policy BE10 of that plan. It does not appear to us that the scale
and mass of the proposed development really has an impact on the undeveloped part
of the Bay which lies within the Green Backdrop Zone. It is the scale and mass
vis-à-vis the neighbours which appears to us to be more
significant.”
11. In summary, the Court was indicating that:-
(i)
It would
have been a “close call” whether a decision by the Minister to grant
the second application was unreasonable in all the circumstances. The Court noted that it would make
“a huge impact on the area” and although it preferred not
to express a firm conclusion, it made it clear (as subsequently acknowledged in
paragraph 73 of the judgment) that it would not itself have granted the
application on grounds of size and mass; in doing so, it emphasised that the
test on appeal is not to assess what the Court would have done had it been the
Minister, but whether the Minister’s decision was unreasonable.
(ii) It would be surprising if modernity and style
of design would be a feature in any objections in the future.
(iii) It would be surprising if objections in the
future relevant to the Green Backdrop Zone in the 2002 Island Plan would
lead to any refusal of permission.
(iv) It was the scale and mass vis-à-vis the
neighbours which was the significant factor.
12. The Court, having quashed the refusal, referred
the matter back to the former Minister.
Rather than take the existing application back to the former Minister,
the applicant elected to modify the application to take into account the views
of the Court. A revised scheme,
which is the subject of this appeal, was submitted on 26th March,
2012, which the applicant believes incorporates those views. We will refer to it for convenience as
“the third application”. Under this scheme, the proposed new
building has been pulled back from the boundary and promenade and divided into
three linked blocks with green roofs (referred to as “volumes”)
with the links incorporating green walls.
The changes are summarised in the affidavit of Adrian Huckson, an
Associate Director of the agent for the applicant, dated 7th August,
2012, as follows:-
“(1) The overall mass
of the proposed new building has been divided into three discrete volumes which
have been pulled back from the boundaries by an average of 1.5 metres.
(2) Vertical gardens have been
incorporated as part of the links between the three volumes so that the volumes
will be viewed as separate units.
The average set back of the linkage between the volumes is 7 metres from
the site boundaries, creating significant further amenity space within the
site.
(3) The northern volume (the part of
the proposed building which is closest to the appellant’s property) has
been rotated so that it is aligned away from the appellant’s property in
order to avoid any direct overlooking between the two properties.
(4) The south east corner of the
proposed building has been set back a further 4.3 metres from the southern
boundary which serves to preserve and indeed enhance the views enjoyed by
Guyscliffe, the property to the south east of the site.
(5) The southern volume of the
proposed building has also been rotated away from Guyscliffe which serves to
provide up to an additional 2 metre distance between the properties allowing
greater privacy for both properties.
(5) The maximum roof height of the
proposed building has been lowered to 20.75 metres above datum so that the
proposed new building is actually lower than the single storey Villa Mimosa
which fronts on to Mont Sohier at the northern end of the site.
(6) The existing Zanzibar structure
sits only 3.5 metres back from the promenade wall at the southern end of the
site. The ground level of the
proposed new building has, however, been pulled back so that it sits 17.7
metres from the promenade wall and the first floor level has been pulled back a
total of 20.4 metres from the promenade wall. The effect of this is to bring the
building fully into line with the building line of adjacent properties on the
seafront. It also improves
significantly the views of the adjacent properties by removing the existing
Zanzibar structure which breaches that notional building line.
(7) The overall size of the building
has been considerably reduced. The
total area of the building, including basement areas, is now 14,014 square
foot. This is a reduction of some
33% from the scheme proposed in the second application which was considered by
the Royal Court. The design of the
property sinks a considerable amount of the floor area below grade. The effect of the modifications to the
scheme is to reduce the above grade floor area of the property by over 1,000
square foot to a total of 7,588 square feet.
(8) The effect of the reductions in
size is that the footprint of the proposed building is now some 5,037 square
feet on a site area (excluding the Mimosa Cottage site) of some 17,423 square
feet. This means that the house
footprint equates to only 28% of the site area, with the remaining 72%
consisting of external amenity space and parking. As I explain in more detail below, this
is a significantly better ratio than that of the appellant’s own property
and of the adjoining properties.
(9) The reduction in the floor area
of the proposed building allows for a significant increase in the permeable and
landscape areas of the site to cover 83% of the site. [This includes the green roofs to the
proposed building]. The site
currently consists of 80% impermeable surfaces which includes a large area of
tarmac for parking with no landscaped areas. The proposed changes substantially
increase the amount of greenery within and around the site as well as
increasing the opportunity for rainwater harvesting.
(10) The reduction in the size of the building
has been matched by a reduction in the number of bedrooms within the proposed
building from 7 to 6. Parking
provision has also been increased to provide for a total of 8 parking spaces
for the site (4 of which are garaged) with the potential for 3 more spaces
should this be necessary.”
13. Mr Huckson goes on in his affidavit to state
that the footprint of the proposed new building as a percentage of the total
site (excluding Villa Mimosa) is significantly less than that of a number of
neighbouring properties which he specifies. He appended a plan showing that the
proposed new building is some 22.5 metres away from the appellant’s
nearest window and because it had been aligned to face away from the
appellant’s property so that it faces on to the existing cottage on the
site, there was, he said, no direct overlooking whatsoever.
14. The application was advertised in the usual way
and seven objections were received, similar to the objections received for the
first and second applications, the common theme remaining the scale and mass of
the development, what was alleged to be an over-development of the site and a
design that was too modern for the context in which it would be sited. The appellant requested a scaffolding
profile in order to assess the effect on her property.
15. The Planning Department’s report noted
that the application in its original form had been refused by the former
Minister in June 2011 against the Planning Department’s advice. Noting that the Royal Court had not
remitted the matter back to the Planning Department for a reassessment of the
merits of the originally refused scheme or any amendment thereto, the remittal
was for the Minister’s attention.
Accordingly, the report was limited to the changes to the scheme
following the Royal Court’s decision to quash the refusal which were
recited in detail and which addressed the significant issue identified by the
Court namely the scale and mass of the proposed new building. The report recommended approval and
concluded as follows:-
“However, given the
reductions in scale and mass of the proposed dwelling and the additional area
now available for planting, the Department’s view is that the applicant
has gone some way in addressing the Reasons for Refusal on the original
decision notice, dated June 2011.
Moreover the dwelling as now proposed would not fill the site envelope
as it was originally intended to do and the urban grain of this part of St
Brelade’s Bay would not be subjected to such compromise as before.”
16. A ministerial meeting was held on 18th
May, 2012. At this stage, the
application fell to be considered in the context of the 2011 Island Plan. The Minister heard representations from
the architects, from the appellant representing herself as a neighbouring owner
but also representing a number of constituents and Deputy John Young, the
Deputy for the district, on his own behalf and also representing
constituents. Deputy Young tabled a
letter from the Connétable of St Brelade in which amongst other things
he requested consideration of the application be deferred pending the
publication of a development plan for St Brelade’s Bay.
17. It transpired that the Planning
Department’s report had not addressed two new policies contained in the 2011
Island Plan, namely Policy E1 (Protection of Employment Land) and Policy
GD2 (Demolition and Replacement of Buildings). The Minister therefore deferred
consideration of the application pending the receipt of a further report by the
Planning Department on these two policies.
The minutes record the Minister’s also acceding to a request from
Mr P Edwards, a neighbour, for the erection of a scaffold profile, although the
appellant appears from paragraph 23 of her affidavit to have been unaware of this.
18. In the event, a scaffold profile was erected
for the Minister alone to view on 23rd May, 2012; it would appear
that no facility was granted to the appellant or the other neighbours who had
attended the ministerial hearing to view the same. The explanation given for this by
Alastair Coates, senior planner at the Planning Department, was that the
scaffold profile had been erected to show the Minister key points and heights
of the proposed new dwelling as part of his decision making process and not to
court further representations from neighbours or the wider public.
19. A supplementary report on policies E1 and GD2
dated 30th May, 2012, was prepared by the Planning Department for
the Minister, but it would appear it was not made available to the appellant or
to the other neighbours who had attended the ministerial meeting.
20. The Minister granted the planning application
on conditions on 13th June, 2012. The reasons given were as follows:-
“The Minister considered
that the proposal complied with the Policies of the 2002 Island Plan, under
which the planning application was originally submitted. During the course of the appeal to the
Royal Court, the 2002 Island Plan was superseded in whole by the 2011 Island
Plan. The principal difference in
the terms of relevance to this planning application was the introduction of
Policies E1 (Protection of Employment Land) and GD2 (Demolition and replacement
of buildings).
In respect of Policy E1, the
Minister accepts that the site is not currently operating as an employment
generator and is not likely to do so without a substantial re-development of
the site, given the evident poor state of the existing Zanzibar buildings.
The loss of the site for
employment use is not considered to be of significant concern as the relatively
small scale restaurant facility would not have been a major employer of local
staff. Moreover, a viable
restaurant concern is likely to result in increased disturbance to nearby
residents by virtue of noise and general disturbance, often at unsocial hours,
and the Minister considers that the replacement of the Zanzibar with a
residential use is likely to have far less impact on residential amenity. Moreover, the Minister is cognisant of
the fact that St Brelade’s Bay is amply catered for in respect of
restaurants, cafés, hotels and leisure facilities and that the loss of
the Zanzibar site as a facility for visitors and residents will not have a
significant impact on the amenities of the area.
The loss of employment land is,
therefore, not considered to be the determinative factor in this case.
In respect of Policy GD2, the
policy requires that the proposed new buildings serve to enhance the appearance
of the site and surroundings and should be seen to replace a building that is
not appropriate to repair or refurbish.
The existing Zanzibar structures on site are of a relatively poor quality
construction with little or no intrinsic merit and the Minister considers that
the proposed replacement is of a higher quality, in terms of design,
sustainability and method of construction.
The proposal is not considered
to be in unreasonable conflict with Policy GD2.
It is also of relevance that
the site is within the Built-up Area wherein there is a presumption in favour
of allowing new dwellings, subject to compliance with other Plan policies. Policy H6 applies in this instance.”
21. Thus having stated that the proposal complied
with the 2002 Island Plan, the Minister addressed himself to what he
regarded as the principal differences between the 2002 and 2011 Plans namely
Policies E1 and GD2.
Legal test on planning appeals
22. The legal test on planning appeals can be found
in Token Limited-v-Planning and Environment Committee [2001] JLR 698 at
paragraph 9:-
“The Court might think that a
Committee’s decision is mistaken, but that does not of itself entitle the
Court to substitute its own decision.
The Court must form its own view of the merits, but it must reach the
conclusion that the Committee’s decision is not only mistaken but also
unreasonable before it can intervene.
There is an element of semantics here but there is, nonetheless, a
qualitative difference between finding that a decision is unreasonable, rather
than simply mistaken. To put it
another way, there is a margin of appreciation before a decision which the
Court thinks to be mistaken becomes so wrong that it is, in the view of the court,
unreasonable.”
Limitation on appellant’s right of appeal
23. In a late written submission, Mr Mills argued
that the appellant’s rights under Article 114 of the Planning Law were
limited to the effect of the proposed development on the amenity of her property
Soleil D’Hiver and that she had no right to address the Court on matters
concerning the public interest.
Quoting from his skeleton argument:-
“It is the function of
the respondent to balance the different elements of the planning equation and
to reach a decision that is correct and just and one of the elements of that
equation is the interests, in planning terms, of neighbours. It is for the respondent as to whether
planning permission should be granted who has got to look at the public
interest. It would therefore be
wrong to rely upon the private landowner, whose personal interests may be
affected, to advance views about the public interest.”
24. He went on to submit that the rationale for the
“50 metre rule” is based on the impact of a development on a near
neighbour thereby ensuring that only those who are likely to be directly
affected by development were to benefit from a statutory right of appeal. In support of this, he cited the
amendment to proposition P.47/2005 brought by Deputy Scott Warren.
25. There was no time at the hearing to hear oral
argument on this submission but on the basis of the written submissions we do
not accept it. The report to the
amendment brought by Deputy Scott Warren makes it clear that the concern was
that third party appeals might increase to an unacceptable level the cost to
the Environment and Public Services Committee of implementing the Planning
Law. Limiting the right of appeal
to those living within 50 metres was aimed at reducing the number of appeals,
not the grounds on which those appeals might be brought.
26. In any event Article 109 of the Planning Law
provides that an appeal to which Article 114 applies may only be made “on the ground that the action taken by or on
behalf of the Minister was unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances
of the case.” The
appellant is therefore entitled to have regard in her appeal to all the
circumstances of the case, not just those which relate to her property.
Appellant’s submissions
27. The appellant’s very detailed submissions
can be summarised as follows:-
(i)
The
application stood to be considered in the light of the 2011 Island Plan,
not the 2002 Island Plan, although she accepted that apart from Policies
E1 and GD2, the relevant policies were broadly similar.
(ii) The statement of the appellant summarised in
the Planning Department’s report that the southern end of the new
building would be no higher than the existing Zanzibar restaurant in order to
maintain the existing relationship with the adjoining properties was incorrect. The existing Zanzibar restaurant is the
same height as the property to the west (Longbeach House) and considerably
lower than the property to the east (Guyscliffe).
(iii) The minutes of the meeting of the Jersey
Architecture Commission on 4th April, 2011, at which the second
application was considered were in her view perfunctory in the extreme,
referring only to the design and making no reference to the effect on the
neighbourhood. Additionally there
is no mention of the manner in which the building fits in to the context of the
neighbourhood.
(iv) Although the northern volume had been rotated,
the wide expanse of windows would still look down on her property.
(v) Whilst the southern elevation is equal in
height to the property to the east (Guyscliffe) it is significantly higher than
the properties to the west (Longbeach House). No account had been taken of the view of
the flanks of the proposed building from the west and the east. She referred to paragraph 86 of Mr
Webster’s affidavit sworn in connection with the second application where
he said this:-
“86. This scale and mass of
development also needs to be seen in the context of the site’s prominent
location in the Bay. The most
visible elevation when viewed from the entire length of promenade and beach to
the west of the site would be the large western flank elevation which, because
of its height, length and unrelieved flat roof will, from the medium and
distant views, provide a large building mass and slab-like appearance which
would be incongruous in its surrounding context.”
(vi) With reference to Policy SP7 “Better by
design” which provides that all development must be of a very high design
quality that maintains and enhances the character and appearance of the area of
Jersey in which it is located, the appellant referred the Court to the original
assessment of the area surrounding the site in the first application and
omitted in the second application, namely “the grain and general style of development along this part of St
Brelade’s Bay is of a more intimate form, with relatively modest units
within reasonable curtilages with no single property standing out from its
neighbours”. This she said remains apposite and, as appeared to the
Court (paragraph 39 of the Ruette Judgment), is significant. This design in combination with its
scale is not appropriate to the grain and character of the area, but in her
view is grossly obtrusive in the area.
The majority of the building’s bulk is along is side flanks, which
is where the neighbours are located.
It is close to the boundaries along the east and west, in particular
next to Guyscliffe and Longbeach House.
No photomontages were supplied by the applicant showing the effect of
the building on the western and eastern sides. The appellant had herself taken photographs
on the western and eastern sides attempting to show the effect of the building.
The scale and mass being imposed is
so far removed from the scale and mass of the neighbourhood that any further
“divorce” from the existing scale and feel to St Brelade’s
Bay built environment can only be detrimental.
(vii) The proposals seek to instate a very radical
and iconic style of architecture more akin to an urban site and certainly not
the quality of this coastal location with its generally traditional style of
architecture. It is entirely out of
context with its surrounds to the serious detriment of the character and
appearance of St Brelade’s Bay and to the amenities of the neighbours. It is inappropriate to insert a large
(14,014 square feet) building in the middle of an area of modest existing
properties of floor spaces in the region of 2,500 square feet. Whilst the difference seems relatively
minor in terms of footprint, it becomes significant when considered in terms of
volume and mass.
(viii) Policy GD1 provides inter alia that proposals will not be permitted which seriously
harm the amenities of neighbouring uses and should, in particular:-
“(a) Not unreasonably affect the level of privacy to
buildings and land that owners and occupiers might expect to enjoy;
(b) Not unreasonably affect the level of
light to buildings and land that owners and occupiers might expect to
enjoy.”
(ix) It was highly questionable as to whether the
development has any genuine value to the area since it will immediately be used
as a precedent for other buildings along the seafront and will have an
unreasonable impact on the character of the seafront. The radical and divorced nature of this
size and design from its surroundings confirms that it is essential to carry
out an Environmental Impact Assessment which should also take into account the
light pollution levels expected from the extent of planar glass to the beach
side elevation. Despite the fact
that the northerly volume had been rotated to the east, the location, size and
angle of the planned large bedroom windows are such that there will be an
unreasonable effect on the privacy of the appellant’s garden and to her
windows to the south and the west.
The proposed building will be severely prejudicial to her property and
insufficient account has been taken of this.
(x) Furthermore there has been no sunlight study
undertaken to assess the effect on both the appellant’s property and
neighbouring properties. The
appellant had commissioned her own report dated September 2012 from Jane Faulkner,
Architect purporting to show the effect of sunlight on neighbouring
properties.
(xi) The appellant questioned whether there was
sufficient constructional depth for a green roof for the proposed building
which would in any event be too high for her to see from her property and she
was concerned that the proposals for solar heating tubes and photo-voltaic
cells which would need to be angled in order to gain the most benefit from the
sun would further increase the height of the building.
(xii) The proposed building will be intrusive in the
view from the sea and beach and Policy GD5 seeks to protect or enhance the
skyline, strategic views, important vistas and the setting of landmark and
listed buildings and places.
(xiii) Policy GD7 “Design Quality”
provides that development will not be permitted which does not adequately
address and appropriately respond to inter
alia-
“(i) The scale, form, massing, orientation,
siting and density of the development and inward and outward views;
(ii) the relationship to existing
buildings, settlement form and character, topography, landscape features and
the wider landscape setting.”
(xiv) The proposed development pays no respect
whatsoever to its setting. Good
planning requires that a building is designed to fit the site, not the site
engineered to fit the building and in this case a site, with proposed
substantial amount of excavation, is being engineered to fit the building. Whilst the second proposal may have been
reduced by some 30% this does not significantly reduce the impact on the neighbourhood
of modest dwellings. The scale and
mass of the previous rejected application proposals given the site location and
context can best be described as preposterous. This latest proposal, despite further
floor reduction, is still for a huge house which is inappropriate and
unacceptable in the context of this site and its surrounds.
(xv) The site was within the Green Backdrop Zone and
had been since 1987. Policy BE3
provides that development will only be permitted where:-
“(i) The landscape remains the dominant
element in the scene and where the proposed development is not visually
prominent or obtrusive in the landscape setting;
(ii) It retains existing trees and
landscape features;
(iii) It presents satisfactory proposals for
new planting which serve to maintain and strengthen the landscape setting and
character of the area.”
(xvi) The appellant drew our attention to paragraph
4.95 of the Island Plan which provides:-
“4.95 The Green Backdrop Zone policy is still considered to be
a useful and legitimate tool in achieving an appropriate lower intensity of
building and a higher degree of open space and planting. It is, however, acknowledged that
greater resolve on its application is needed than has been applied in the past
and that greater attention to the requirements for new and enhanced landscaping
in this zone, as an integral element of new development proposals, in accord
with Policy NE 4 ‘Trees, woodland and boundary features’, is
required. New development in the
Green Backdrop Zone will also likely need to be considered within the context
of its potential impact upon views, in accord with Policy GD 5 ‘Skyline,
views and vistas.’”
(xvii) By recommending approval, the Minister was
imposing an unnecessary compromise on the neighbourhood and was certainly not
applying greater resolve in the application of the policy. Whilst the design statement describes
the site coverage as being 83% landscaped, it should be noted that 23% of the
site is actually the green roof of the proposed building and 23% permeable
paving. It was not clear to the
appellant what the Court meant in paragraph 52 of the Ruette Judgment
where it said that “It does not appear to us that the scale and
mass of the proposed development really had an impact on the undeveloped part
of the Bay which lies within the Green Backdrop Zone”.
(xviii) Proposal 14 in the chapter headed “Built
Environment” in the 2011 Plan states that the Minister will develop a
planning framework for inter alia “St
Brelade’s Bay, to ensure that development is sympathetic to its context
and does not detract from the visual amenity of the Bay and the public
enjoyment of it.” That
is yet to be developed but the appellant submitted that Proposal 14
incorporates the proposition adopted by the States in 1968 (P15/1968) which
provided that apart from eight sites where quality buildings could be built, no
other residential development would be permitted in the area of the Bay except
for limited extensions. P15/1968
should therefore have been considered by the Minister. Alternatively, the Minister should have
delayed consideration of the application pending development of the planning
framework for St Brelade’s Bay.
(xix) Both the Planning Department and the Minister
had failed satisfactorily to address Policy E1 and GD2. Policy E1 provides that there will be a
presumption against development which results in the loss of land for
employment use unless:-
“1. it is demonstrated that the site is
inappropriate for any employment use to continue, having regard to market
demand. Applications will need to
be accompanied by documentary evidence that the size, configuration, access
arrangements or other characteristics of the site make it unsuitable and
financially unviable for any employment use and confirmation by full and proper
marketing of the site on terms that reflect the lawful use and conditions of
the premises, or;
2…….
3. the
overall benefit to the community of the proposal outweighs any adverse effect
on employment opportunities and the range of available employment land and
premises;”
(xx) The Minister was dismissive, she said, of the
concept of the property continuing to be a restaurant (which it had been since
the 1930s with no problems for the neighbours) and considered that St
Brelade’s Bay was amply catered for in terms of restaurants. He provided no evidence justifying the
demolition of the existing buildings.
It was quite feasible, the appellant said, for it to re-open and equally
feasible for it to operate as a neighbourhood bistro without disturbing the
surrounding houses. The report on
the viability of the restaurant was prepared by a senior planner and was
extremely superficial with no numerical analysis of the claims in respect of
the employment of construction staff for maintenance, gardening and household.
(xxi) Policy GD2 provides inter alia that demolition of an existing building will not be
permitted unless the proposed development involves the demolition of a building
that is not appropriate “in sustainability terms to repair or
refurbish”. The
Minister had provided no evidence to support his contention that it is not
appropriate to repair or refurbish the existing building. There is no condition survey and no
viability statement. The core of
the building has been standing since the 1950’s and probably the
1930’s. As it is still
standing it raises doubts, she said, about whether the building is impossible
to renovate.
Respondent’s submissions
28. Mr Mills pointed out that this site lies within
the Built up Area where pursuant to Policy H6 proposals for new dwellings will
be permitted. Such proposals had to
be considered in the context of general development indicators and other
relevant policies but this is not a development which in policy terms starts
with a presumption against development.
29. The third application had seen the bulk and
mass of the building reduced considerably from the previous schemes with the
building being broken down into three volumes with linked corridors. It did not now form one continuous mass
and was therefore less overbearing to neighbouring properties as previously
proposed. All the measures
summarised at paragraph 12 above and the proposed landscaping would limit any
adverse impact on neighbouring properties to an acceptable degree. The impact on the character of the area
had been addressed. Principal views
of the site from the widest surrounding area would be from the bay to the south
from which the proposed building would be no higher than the neighbouring
properties and would now be set back some 17.7 metres from the promenade at
ground level and 20.4 metres back at upper floor level. The Minister considered that the impact
of the proposed development on the character of the area was acceptable.
30. In relation to the Green Backdrop Zone Mr Mills
referred to the view of the Court in the Ruette Judgement that the
development would not have an unacceptable impact on this Zone. The application had in any event been
further amended to improve the landscaping.
31. He reminded the Court that the reasonableness
of the decision to grant planning permission should be judged according to the
material that was before the Minister at the time the decision was made (13th
June, 2012,) as made clear by the Court of Appeal in Trump Holdings Limited-v-Planning
and Environment Committee [2004] JLR 232 at paragraph 20. The appellant’s report from Jane
Faulkner, Architect, commissioned after the decision, had not been before the
Minister. We would interpose to say
that whilst we accept that is the case, it leaves open the issue of whether the
Minister should himself have commissioned such a report.
32. It was clear from the Ruette Judgment
and indeed from Article 19(2) of the Planning Law that the application fell to
be determined under the 2011 Island Plan. The terminology used in the
Minister’s decision is a matter of form, not substance and the language
is reflective of how the application came before him. There is no doubt said Mr Mills that the
decision was made with respect to the 2011 Island Plan. The decision conveys firstly that all
other things being equal in the Minister’s opinion the application was
consistent with the thrust of the policies that were broadly the same as
between the 2002 and 2011 Plans and secondly that there were two policies in
the 2011 Plan, namely Policies E1 and GD2 which were new. These two policies had been addressed by
the Minister and specifically dealt with in the reasons given for the approval.
The Minister acted in a reasonable
and proportionate manner in addressing these two policies to the extent that
they presented hurdles which did not exist under the 2002 Island Plan,
bearing in mind that the delay in dealing with the application and for the
application now having to be considered under the 2011 Island Plan was
attributable to serious procedural irregularities on the part of the former
Minister.
33. In terms of Policy GD2, the test Mr Mills
submitted was not whether it is economically viable to repair or refurbish a
building but whether it is appropriate in sustainability terms to repair or
refurbish it. In this regard there
was plenty of evidence for the Minister to rely on, for example his own observations
on the site visit, the advice of his case officer, the submissions made to him
at the ministerial meeting and indeed from an analysis of some of the objection
letters which acknowledged the development of the site would be appropriate.
34. Policies, Mr Mills said, often pull in
different directions and their application will require an exercise of
judgment. Where policies pull in
different directions, it may be necessary to decide which the dominant policy
is: where the one policy compared to another is directly as opposed to
tangentially relevant, or should be seen as the one to which the greater weight
is required to be given. The main
policy in respect of this application was, in his view, without doubt Policy H6
of the Island Plan.
35. The scale and mass of the proposed development
was the real issue in this case, as identified by the Ruette appeal
judgment and as was clear from the appellant’s submissions. Very careful thought and consideration
had been given to the massing of the proposed building. The easternmost faces are primarily solid
which assists in enabling privacy.
However, the linear massing is broken up by the use of vertical gardens
so that when viewed in context the proposed buildings convey the impression of
an apparent mass of three separate buildings, instead of one. The effect in visual terms is three
buildings with a lesser footprint than its neighbours. The apparent scale and mass is therefore
consistent with the surrounding area.
36. The style of the design has not changed since
the Ruette appeal and in this respect it was worth repeating what the
Court in the Ruette judgment said at paragraph 51:-
“In the light of the fact
that the Minister is a corporation sole and in the light of the former Senator
Cohen’s approval of the modernity and style of the design, supported as
it was by the Jersey Architecture Commission and the States architect, we would
be surprised if design and modernity were to be a feature in any objections
which are made in the future, and we think it might be difficult to justify as
reasonable any refusal of permission based on these grounds particularly
because we do not understand the notice of refusal of 10th June to set out
these grounds as relevant to the refusal at that time.”
37. The proposal does not affect or obscure any
skyline or any strategic view or important vista and Policy GD5 – “Skyline
– Views and Vistas” – did not therefore apply. It was of note that the site is not part
of the Shoreline Zone as applied by Policy BE4. That policy deals specifically with the
protection, enhancement and creation of “visual access” to the shoreline involving views
to the foreshore and sea, often through the maintenance of open space and gaps
between buildings along the coastline of the Built up Area.
38. In terms of the design quality and Policy GD7
the modernity and style of the design was supported by the Jersey Architecture
Commission and by the States architect.
The surrounding area has an eclectic character with a variety of uses,
building masses and architectural styles.
The area has an array of building types: bungalows, large villas,
houses, apartments and hotels, each of which have their own architectural
styles.
39. In terms of footprint, the proposed building is
bigger than its immediate neighbours but the site itself is capable of bearing
a footprint of 5,037 square feet, which will be about 28% of the site.
40. Policy GD1 refers to “seriously” harming
the amenities of neighbours, which is a tacit recognition that even where there
may be harm, development may nevertheless be acceptable because the harm is not
serious. Loss of a view may be an
element of the loss of amenity to be taken into account but is not per se a material planning factor (see Dunn-v-Minister
for Planning and Environment [2009] JRC 237 at paragraph 10). Due to the fact that the site is within
the Built up Area any harm to the amenities of neighbours could not be
described as serious.
41. Proposal 14 is precisely that – a
proposal amongst a number of proposals put forward in the 2011 Island Plan
which has yet to be put into effect.
It is difficult to see, said Mr Mills, how the Minister could be in
breach of something that does not yet exist. When a local development plan for
St Brelade’s Bay is formulated it will be adopted as supplementary
planning guidance to be approved by the Minister. Until then it is manifestly unfair to
expect any applicant to deal with something that is very much in the
abstract. In any event the position
of the Minister is that the development is consistent with the Island Plan
policies that deal with or touch upon visual amenity, scale and massing (for
example GD1, GD2, GD5 and GD7).
42. Finally, Mr Mills submitted that the public
nature and requirement for consultation of the planning applications process
will undoubtedly mean that the Minister will be confronted by different views
and opinions when it comes to making a decision. That a decision is made with which a
person disagrees does not mean that the decision is an unreasonable one, nor
does it mean that a person’s views and observations have not been taken
into account.
Applicant’s submissions
43. Mr Jowitt, for the applicant, aligned the
applicant with the submissions of the Minister, referring in particular to what
he described as the very considerable changes to the plans made in order to
address the concerns of both the Minister and the Court.
44. In addition, Mr Jowitt pointed to planning
gains for the neighbours as a consequence of the southern end of the proposed
building being pulled back, enhancing the views from Guyscliffe to the south
west and Longbeach House to the south east (neither of which they currently
enjoy) – the current Zanzibar building being some 3 metres from the
promenade.
45. No guidance notes existed to inform the process
by which the Minister ought to consider applications under Policies E1 and
GD2. Guidance note entitled “Protection
of Employment Land” were adopted on 23rd June, 2012, ten days
after the Minister’s decision and 36 days after the ministerial meeting,
and they do not therefore apply to the decision which is being appealed
against.
46. The only question is whether the conclusion
reached by the Minister in respect of these two policies was one which he was
entitled to reach and it was reasonable.
In Mr Jowitt’s submission the decisions reached in respect of both
policies were manifestly reasonable.
Furthermore, he went on to reiterate the point in relation to procedural
fairness should it be considered that there had been a departure from these two
policies. The matter fell to be
considered afresh under the 2011 Island Plan because of the procedural
irregularities on the part of the Minister and even if it could be said that
consideration of these policies did require the professional reports contended
for by the appellant, it would be procedurally unfair to require the applicant
to surmount such hurdles now when they did not exist under the 2002 Island
Plan.
47. Additionally, Mr Jowitt submitted that the
Minister’s public position throughout the history of this application
communicated unequivocally to the applicant was that residential development of
the land was inevitable. On that
basis too it would be procedurally unfair now to require the applicant to
overcome new hurdles created by the 2011 Island Plan or by guidance
notes adopted pursuant to it.
48. In relation to Proposal 15 the 2011 Island
Plan says this at paragraph 4.86:-
“4.86 St Brelade’s Bay is generally regarded as one of
the most beautiful natural bays in the Island. Successive development plans have sought
to retain and protect its natural beauty and character whilst recognising its
role as an attractive place for tourists and islanders to visit and as a place
to stay and live. However, it is
important that the spirit of the 1968 proposition ‘Development in St
Brelade’s Bay area (P.15/1968’ and the 1989 St Brelade’s Bay
Environmental Improvement Plan, continue to be addressed in this and subsequent
Island Plans where they remain relevant today.”
49. In so far as the spirit of the 1968 proposition
might be described as fiercely restrictive it is difficult, Mr Jowitt said, to
see its relevance today. In so far
as it might be described as concerned to ensure appropriate development within
the Bay, it complements, he said, the existing policies of the 2011 Island
Plan which were relevant to this application, and which the Minister
considered carefully.
50. The 1989 Environmental Improvement Plan
was, he submitted, primarily a response to problems caused by tourism in the St
Brelade’s Bay. It offers no
additional planning insight which is not already covered by the substantive
policies of the 2011 Island Plan.
It does, however, he observed in respect of the Zanzibar restaurant
state that “This building has
deteriorated and its external appearance is poor. Total remodelling or reconstruction with
a high standard of design is required.
Tree planting would also improve the appearance of the car park.” (Paragraph 7.16)
51. Some overlooking was inevitable in the Built up
Area but the proposed building had been pulled back from the boundaries and
separated into three volumes, the northern and southern volumes being re-orientated
for the benefit of Guyscliffe and of the appellant’s property. The western and eastern flanks had now
been broken up, but it was difficult to see them because of the amount of
foliage in neighbouring properties; hence a photomontage of the views from the
west and east would have been of little assistance.
Procedural irregularity
52. Following the hearing, the Court received
further detailed written submissions on a point which it raised relating to
that part of the procedural history described in paragraphs 18 and 19 above;
namely the Minister, following the ministerial meeting of 18th May,
2012, not giving the appellant the facility to view the scaffold profile and
not making available to her the supplementary reports of Policies E1 and
GD2. The Court was concerned to
consider whether this may have been procedurally unfair, depriving the
appellant of the ability to make adequately informed submissions to the
Minister.
53. We will not set out those submissions but we
have drawn from them for the purposes of this part of the judgement. It is necessary first to describe briefly
the evidence in relation to the scaffold profile, which we have taken from the
second affidavit of Adrian Huckson on 22nd October, 2012. He said he learnt from comments made in the
press by the Minister after the ministerial meeting that he intended to request
that a scaffold profile be erected on the site. He liaised with Mr Alistair Coates of
the Planning and Environment Department and arranged for the Minister to attend
on site on 23rd May, 2012.
On 22nd May, 2012, he arranged for an engineer and land
surveyor to survey the site, mark out the footprint of the proposed new
building and establish the positioning and heights of the scaffold
profiles.
54. The Minister attended the site on 23rd
May, 2012, accompanied by Mr Coates.
Mr Huckson summarised the work which had been undertaken in order to
produce the outline on the site of the proposed new building and in order to
establish the heights of the scaffold profiles. The Minister and Mr Coates walked
through the site and reviewed the physical outline which had been
prepared. Mr Huckson explained to
the Minister and Mr Coates the orientation of the individual volumes and their
relationship with the site boundaries and walked them through the site. The Minister inspected the existing
buildings from both inside and outside.
Mr Huckson recalled the Minister viewing the north-east scaffold profile
(the corner of the proposed building which is closest to the appellant’s
property) both from within the site and from outside the site on Mont
Sohier. At the southern end of the
site the Minister viewed the proposed setting back of the new building from the
southern boundary and asked to view the scaffold profile at the south-east
corner of the proposed new building which is the corner adjacent to
Guyscliffe. Mr Huckson remembers
the Minister viewing this profile from a number of positions, including from
the beach itself.
55. In his affidavit he says that the Minister
therefore saw profiles demonstrating the height of the building at both the
most southerly and northerly points and saw the proposed new building
physically marked out on the site, which showed the relationship of the
proposed new building to the neighbouring properties and the height of the
building running from north to south.
56. The starting point in relation to the
consultation process is the statutory framework. The responsibility for making a decision
in relation to the grant of planning permission rests with the Minister
(Article 19 of the Planning Law).
Article 11(1) of the Planning Law requires the Minister by Order to
prescribe the manner in which representations may be provided by members of the
public on applications for planning permission. This was done by the Planning and
Building (Application Publication)(Jersey) Order 2006 (“the
Order”).
57. Article 4(1) of the Order requires any
representation in respect of a planning application to be provided to the
Minister in writing within 21 days of the application being published. The Minister is obliged, in accordance
with Article 11(4) of the Planning Law to take into account in determining the
application any such representations made.
58. There is no obligation under the Planning Law
for the Minister to provide those who have made representations in relation to
a planning application with an opportunity to make further representations
prior to any decision being made.
Indeed, Supplementary Planning Guidance Practice Note 16, (which
sets out a step by step guide to the planning applications process) states:-
“You must comment in writing
(letter or email) or via our website.
You can object to the application, support it, or simply draw things to
the attention of the planning officers.
We will acknowledge receipt of your comments within 5 working days. We will take them into account when
assessing the application but we do not have the resources to respond in
writing to individual queries or meet you in person.”
59. Practice Note 16 also provides that where it is
decided that a planning application will be determined by the Minister himself
(as opposed to being determined under delegated authority by planning officers
or the Planning Applications Panel):-
“The Minister may determine
planning applications at public meetings or in consultation with planning
officers. The Minister can defer an
application from a public meeting and determine it later after further
consideration”.
60. There is accordingly no statutory obligation on
the Minister to afford either those objecting to an application or indeed the
applicant for planning permission with an opportunity to make further
representations following a public meeting.
61. Practice Note 7 (which sets out protocols for
public meetings of the Minister) expressly provides (at paragraph 7) that:-
“if
the Minister wishes to visit a site, he may defer an application to do so. An
unaccompanied visit will take place and the decision issued after that
date”. (our emphasis)
62. The appellant has exercised her right of appeal
under Article 114 of the Planning Law and is now a litigant, but it is
important to remember that we are concerned here with the earlier stage of the
process in which the Minister is consulting with those members of the public
who are interested in the application.
As Lord Wolfe MR said in R-v-North and East Devon Health Authority Ex
P. Coughlan [2001] QB 213, a case which concerned a public body exercising
a statutory function, at paragraph 112:-
“It has to be remembered that
consultation is not litigation: the consulting authority is not required to
publicise every submission it receives or (absent some statutory obligation) to
disclose all its advice. Its
obligation is to let those who have a potential interest in the subject matter know
in clear terms what the proposal is and exactly why it is under positive
consideration, telling them enough (which may be a good deal) to enable them to
make an intelligent response. The
obligation, although it may be quite onerous, goes no further than this.”
63. A similar warning against applying to
procedures involved in the making of administrative decisions concepts that are
appropriate to the conduct of ordinary civil litigation between private parties
was made by Lord Green MR in B. Johnston & Co (Builders) Limited-v-Minister
of Health [1947] 2 All E.R. 395 at 399 to 400.
64. In Interface Management limited and others-v-Jersey
Financial Services Commission [2003] JLR 524, the Court considered
the legal test applied by the Court in administrative appeals in the light of Token-v-Planning
and Environment Committee [2001] JLR 698 and in particular, considered the
approach to be taken by the Court to considering issues of procedural fairness
on appeal. The Court stated at
paragraph 35:-
“It
follows that …. The court will look at three aspects on an appeal. First, it will consider whether the
decision was one which the decision-maker was empowered to make i.e. was the
decision ultra vires? Secondly, it
will look at the correctness and fairness of the procedure in order to decide
whether the proceedings of the decision-maker were in general sufficient and
satisfactory. Thirdly, it will look
at the merits of the decision and decide whether it considers that the decision
was unreasonable. Where an appeal
is allowed because of procedural errors or unfairness of sufficient gravity,
the likely remedy will be that the decision is quashed and the matter remitted
to the decision-maker for reconsideration”. [Our emphasis]
65. It is clear from this that in an administrative
appeal, the Court will not quash a decision in every case where there has been
some procedural irregularity. The
Court is concerned in an administrative appeal with considering whether the
proceedings which were followed were, in all the circumstances, in general
sufficient and satisfactory. Put
another way it is only where any procedural errors or unfairness are
sufficiently serious to render the decision itself unreasonable that the Court
will intervene.
66. This is consistent with the approach taken by
the Court in Blackall and Danby Ltd-v-Island Development Committee
[1963] JJ 273 where, in the context of an appeal against a decision not to
renew a planning permit, the Court said at page 280:-
“…the Court would not
consider it right to allow an appeal merely because of some defect in the proceedings
leading to the Committee’s decision if, notwithstanding that defect, the
decision was reasonable, that is to say, the Court must be concerned with the
unreasonableness of the decision itself rather than with the unreasonableness
of the surrounding circumstances.”
67. The approach adopted by the English courts to
questions of procedural fairness in relation to appeals in England against
decisions of a Secretary of State Inspector in planning matters is to ask
itself whether the claimant had a “fair
crack of the whip”. In Castleford
homes Ltd-v-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions
and another [2001] All ER (D) 31, Ouseley J stated at paragraph 52:-
“The relevant law, though not
cited to me, is to be found in cases such as Fairmont Investment Ltd. v the
Secretary of State for the Environment 1976] 1 WLR 1255 at p. 1255; and H.
Sabey & Co. Ltd. v The Secretary of State for the Environment [1978] 1 All
ER 586. Did the Claimant have a
“fair crack of the whip?” Was the Claimant deprived of an
opportunity to present material by an approach on the part of the inspector
which he did not and could not reasonably have anticipated? Or is he trying to improve his case
subsequently, having been substantially aware of, or alerted to, the key issues
at the Inquiry? Did he simply fail
to realise that he might lose on an aspect which was fairly and squarely at
issue and hence fail to put forward his fall-back case? Those are the sort of questions which
can be used to guide a conclusion as to whether the manner in which a
particular issue was dealt with at an Inquiry involved a breach of natural
justice and was unfair”.
68. It is important to recognise, of course, that
the role carried out by a Secretary of State Inspector in England is an appellate
role under which an inquiry is conducted by the Inspector and in relation to
which there is no third party appeal on the merits. Conversely, the Minister in Jersey is
charged with making an administrative decision under the Planning Law in
relation to which third parties have a right of appeal to the Court on the
merits.
69. In this case, we are dealing with the process
of consultation with the public undertaken by the Minister who has the
responsibility for making the decision, having taken into account the
representations made. There is no
criticism of the process of consultation conducted by the Minister up to the
ministerial meeting. The revised
application was duly publicised and together with the relevant plans was
available for inspection. The appellant
and others were able to make detailed written submissions and subsequently oral
submissions to the Minister at the public hearing. As made clear in Practice Note 16,
the Minister then deferred the application for further consideration by
him. The appellant had complained
of the scale and mass of the proposed new building and its proximity to her
home and we accept the submissions of the respondent and the applicant that the
Minister requested the scaffold profiles to be erected to assist him to make
his decision as to whether those objections were borne out.
70. There was nothing clandestine in the
arrangements. The decision to erect
the scaffold profile was noted in the minutes and announced in the media. The Minister attended the site with a
planning officer. It was inevitable
that in order to have access to the site and to be satisfied with the
preparations undertaken by the applicant’s engineer that the Minister
would have contact with the applicant’s agent for the purpose of that
exercise. There was no evidence
that the communications went anything beyond what was necessary to enable the
Minister to carry out this exercise properly. The site visit was not an opportunity
for further representations to be made to the Minister by any of the interested
parties and there was no legitimate expectation that such further opportunities
would be given to the interested parties.
71. In our view, the appellant has had “a fair crack of the whip” in that
she has been consulted over the application and has been able, as with all
other members of the public who were interested in the application, to make
informed written and oral representations to the Minister. To suggest that the Minister is under an
obligation, having received those representations, to involve the appellant and
presumably all those other persons who have an interest in the application with
every step that he subsequently takes in reaching the decision for which he
alone is responsible, is to fall into the trap of equating this process to litigation,
but as Lord Wolfe said, it is consultation not litigation. The appellant has been consulted and her
representations have been taken into account. We do not regard the Minister asking for
scaffold profiles to be erected to enable him in his decision-making process
after receiving the appellant’s representations at a public hearing and
in a manner which is consistent with the Practice Notes as in any way
procedurally unfair or irregular.
72. Turning to the supplementary report by the
Planning Department on Policies E1 and GD2, it is difficult to see how it can
be said that there can be any procedural unfairness to the appellant (and
accordingly any prejudice to the appellant) in not being given the opportunity
to consider and respond to this internal report commissioned to advise the
Minister on two policies which formed no part of the objections raised by the
appellant in either her written or oral representations.
73. The appellant is, of course, able to raise
arguments in relation to Policies E1 and GD2 as part of her appeal as she has
done, which the Court will take into account in determining whether the
decision of the Minister was reasonable or not, but it would be unfair on the
applicant for the Court to quash the decision because of an alleged failure by
the Minister to provide the appellant with copies of advice he had received
from his own department on issues which were never addressed by the appellant
and which formed no part of her objections to the proposed scheme.
74. In any event it is clear to us that there is no
obligation upon the Minister to disclose such a report as part of the
consultation process to parties who are interested in the application, as made
clear in that part of the judgement of Lord Wolfe in North and East Devon
Authority cited above. In Bushell
and another-v-Secretary of State for the Environment [1980] 2 All ER 608,
Lord Diplock stated (at pages 613 and 618) in the context of a decision made by
the Secretary of State following a public inquiry in relation to the proposed
construction of two motorways:-
“To treat the minister in his
decision-making capacity as someone separate and distinct from the department
of government of which he is the political head and for whose actions he alone
in constitutional theory is accountable to Parliament is to ignore not only
practical realities but also Parliament’s intention. Ministers come and go; departments,
though their names may change from time to time, remain. Discretion in making administrative
decisions is conferred on a minister not as an individual but as the holder of
an office in which he will have available to him arriving at this decision the
collective knowledge, experience and expertise of all those who serve the Crown
in the department of which, for the time being, he is the political head. The collective knowledge, technical as
well as factual, of the civil servants in the department and their collective
expertise are to be treated as the minister’s own knowledge, his own
experience.
……
“Once he has reached his decision
he must be prepared to disclose his reasons for it, because the Tribunals and
Inquiries Act 1971 so requires; but he is, in my view, under no obligation to
disclose to objectors and give them an opportunity of commenting on advice,
expert or otherwise, which he receives, from his department in the course of
making up his mind. If he thinks
that to do so will be helpful to him in reaching the right decision in the
public interest he may, of course, do so; but if he does not think it will be
helpful and this for him to decide, failure to do so cannot in my view be
treated as a denial of natural justice to the objectors.”
75. The House of Lords approved and applied those
observations in the context of a ministerial decision involving considerations
of policy as well as judgment in a planning matter in R (Alconbury
Developments Ltd)-v-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and
Regions [2003] 2 AC 295. In
that case Lord Clyde stated (at paragraph 141) that:-
“Within his department a
minister may well take advice on law and policy (Bushell v Secretary of State
for the Environment [1981] AC 75) and the Secretary of State is entitled to
seek elucidation on matters raised by the case which he has to decide, provided
always that he observes the basic rules of fairness. In particular he should in fairness give
the parties an opportunity to comment if after a public inquiry some
significant factual material of which the parties might not be aware comes to
his notice through departmental inquiry.”
76. The comments in Bushell and Alconbury
Developments were made in the context of decisions taken by the Secretary
of State following a public inquiry where it is submitted there will be an
enhanced expectation on the part of objectors to be consulted than in the case of
an administrative decision by the Minister on a standard planning
application. In Re the matter of
the X Children [2009] JCA 083, the Jersey Court of Appeal echoed those
comments in the context of a decision by the Minister for Health and Social
Services in a child protection matter where it stated: -
“For
avoidance of doubt we observe that we see nothing objectionable in either the
Placement Panel, or the Minister, after any dialogue or colloquy with the
guardian and other involved parties, reaching a decision in private or in the
Minister making use of the expertise of his own department in reaching his
decision; see Bushell v Environment Secretary [1981] AC 75 per Lord
Diplock at p. 95-96.”
77. In this case no significant new factual
material is contained in the supplementary report produced by the Planning
Department. The report simply sets
out the views of an officer of the Planning Department on the issues raised by
Policies E1 and GD2. The report was
prepared by a member of the Planning Department to assist the Minister in
making his decision in light of representations which had been raised on those
policies. Obtaining written advice
of this sort is in practical terms no different to the Minister sitting down
with members of the Planning Department to obtain their views on a proposed
application or to discuss policy considerations prior to making a
decision. It would be nonsensical
for the Minister to have to disclose the content of those discussions to objectors
or to applicants to enable them to make comment prior to the Minister making a
decision. There is no procedural
unfairness in objectors and applicants not being privy to those internal
discussions. The position of
objectors and applicants is adequately protected by their right of appeal on
the merits to the Court if they consider that the Minister’s decision is
unreasonable.
Decision
78. What is unusual in this case is that, although
the decision to approve the third application has been made by the Minister and
it is that decision that this Court is reviewing, guidance has been given on
the merits by the Court in the Ruette appeal as summarised in paragraph
11 above. Effectively that Court
has narrowed down the issues to that of the scale and mass of the proposed new
building vis-à-vis the neighbours.
The applicant has understandably
taken that guidance into account as the changes to the scheme (as summarised in
paragraph 12 above) all address that issue. The Planning Department in its report and
the Minister have also taken that guidance into account. It is for that reason, in our view, that
the Minister has addressed himself in his reasons principally towards the
differences between the 2002 Plan and the 2011 Plan (identified as being
policies E1 and GD2), the Court having noted that the application it was
referring back to him would now have to be considered under the 2011 Plan.
79. Whilst guidance of this kind may not be
strictly binding on this Court, it has understandably been relied upon by the
applicant, the Planning Department and the Minister and in our view it would be
unfair for this Court to now depart from it, if it was minded to do so. The Court is not so minded and a
consequence of this is that we find that the Minister was reasonable in
approving the modernity and style of the proposed new building (a key complaint
of the appellant) and finding that the scheme was consistent with Policy BE3
(Green Backdrop Zone).
80. There is no question that the third application
is an improvement in terms of scale and mass over the second application, which
the Planning Department recommended should be approved and which it would seem
the former Minister would have approved, but for what he perceived as political
interference, subject perhaps to “breaking the roof of the main
building a little” (see paragraph 26 of the Ruette
judgment). Just because the third
application is an improvement does not of course justify its approval. The test is not a comparison with what
has gone before, but rather as the Court made clear in Hobson-v-The Minister
of Planning and Environment [2012] JRC 200 at paragraph 56:-
“The test on each application
is not comparison with what has gone before on the basis that any improvements
suggest a consent, but rather, in accordance with Article 19 of the Planning
Law, whether the proposal is consistent with the Island Plan and is appropriate
given all material planning considerations, or whether permission can be
justified despite the inconsistency with the Island Plan.”
81. Taking into account the guidance given by the
Court in the Ruette judgement, the key issue on this appeal is whether
the scale and mass of the proposed new building vis-à-vis its neighbours is consistent with the relevant
policies of the 2011 Plan, which it is accepted are not in this respect
materially different from the 2002 Plan, the relevant policies being H6, GD1
and GD7.
82. Was the Minister’s decision on this key
issue mistaken and if so was it unreasonable?
83. Despite being situated on the coast of one of
the Island’s most beautiful bays, it is important to appreciate that the
site is in the built up area, where pursuant to Policy SP1, development will be
concentrated and pursuant to Policy H6, proposals for new dwellings will be
permitted subject, of course to consideration of the general development policies
in this case specifically GD1 and GD7.
The site is not in the Coastal National Park (where there is the
strongest presumption against any form of new development) or the Shoreline
Zone (which protects visual access to the shoreline, involving views to the
foreshore and sea often through the maintenance of open space and gaps between
buildings along the coastline).
84. The changes to the scheme are significant. It can no longer be described as being
“shoehorned” into the site.
The east and west faces of the building are primarily solid, which
assists in enabling privacy. The
linear mass is broken up into three volumes, which with the use of vertical
gardens will convey the impression, we were told, of three separate buildings
instead of one. The building will
be sunk into the slope so that its apparent mass from Le Mont Sohier will be
that it appears to be one storey, being similar in level to Mimosa
Cottage. At the southern end of the
site, whilst higher than Longbeach House, the plans show that the southern
elevation is equal to or lower than other properties along the front. It remains a large property, now broken
up into three volumes, but it is set in a large site.
85. We found the key issue very difficult but after
anxious discussion we concluded that in the context of a site in the Built-up
Zone and in the light of the guidance given by the Court in the Ruette appeal
and of the relevant policies, it was not unreasonable for the Minister to have
approved the proposed new building on the grounds of its scale and mass and
that it would not “seriously” harm the amenities of the
neighbouring uses.
86. There are a number of other issues outwith the
guidance of the Court in the Ruette judgement raised by the appellant
which we need to address:-
(i)
Should the
Minister have commissioned his own sunlight study (Paragraph 27(x) above)? In Farina-v-Minister for Planning
[2010] JLR Note 30, it was held that the Minister’s duty is not to make
all possible inquiries into relevant matters but inquiries that are appropriate
and proportionate to the circumstances.
Apart from contending that the Minister should have commissioned his own
sunlight study, the appellant did not seek to draw any specific conclusions
from the sunlight study that she had commissioned. We found it difficult to draw any
conclusions from it ourselves. It
was not unreasonable for the Minister, in our view, to proceed to make a
decision without commissioning such a study.
(ii) The appellant also complained about the failure
of the Minister to require photo montages showing the proposed building from
the east and west sides. Those
could have been commissioned, but there again, the Minister had photo montages
from Le Mont Sohier and from the beach, together with the plans, and we do not
think it was unreasonable for the Minister to proceed without commissioning
further photo montages, bearing in mind that he also personally visited the
site and had the benefit of scaffold profiles as part of his decision making
process.
(iii) Should the Minister have considered the
proposition adopted by the States in 1968 (P15/ 1968) (see Paragraph 27(xviii)
above)? The 2011 Plan at paragraph
4.86 refers to it being important that the spirit of this 1968 proposition and
the 1989 St Brelade’s Bay Environmental Improvement Plan continue
to be addressed in this and subsequent Island Plans, where it remains relevant
today. Under proposal 14 of the
2011 Plan, it is proposed that the Minister will develop a planning framework
for St Brelade’s Bay, which has yet to be undertaken. The spirit of the 1968 proposal has
presumably been addressed in the actual policies set out in the 2011 Plan and
will continue to be addressed in proposal 14, whenever that is formulated. The Minister can hardly be criticized
for failing to take into account a framework that is not in existence and in so
far as it is currently addressed within the 2011 Plan the Minister has, in our
view, considered the relevant policies carefully. There is no substance therefore in this
submission.
(iv) Did the Minister fail satisfactorily to address
Policy E1 and GD2, which are effectively the new policies brought in by the
2011 Plan (see paragraph 27(xix) above)?
There can be no doubt that the Minister considered these policies
carefully as he deferred his decision at the ministerial meeting so that, in
addition to requesting a scaffold profile, he could obtain further advice from
his Planning Department. He then
addressed both policies at length in his reasons for the decision. He had been advised that the
restaurant on the site had closed for lack of business in November 2009, which
would seem to us a clear indication of lack of market demand but the issue is
whether it was reasonable for the Minister to have acted on the advice of the
Planning Department, or whether he should have further deferred the application
in order for more in depth research to be commissioned. We can see nothing on the face of the
advice to suggest that he should have done this.
(v) The appellant submitted that the Minister
provided no evidence to support his contention that it was not appropriate “in sustainability terms to repair or
refurbish” the existing building. There may be circumstances in which a
survey should be required but it is not in our view necessary in every
case. It may be a matter of common
sense, which the Minister is able to decide himself bearing in mind he
personally inspected the interior and exterior of the existing building. In Winchester City Council-v-Secretary
of State for the Environment [1980] 39 P. and C.R. 1, Lord Denning said
this at page 4:-
“I am afraid that I cannot
agree with this contention. This
was not a scientific or technical point on which evidence from both sides was
necessary or even desirable. It was
a matter of aesthetic taste – or common sense, if you like. Anyone with reasonable intelligence
going to see this house could tell for himself whether it was suitable to be
extended and made into a bigger house, or not, or whether it would spoil it to
try to add to it. It did not need
skilled architects to give evidence about it. It was a matter that the inspector could
judge perfectly well for himself.
That is what he meant when he said that it was “not
necessary” to call evidence on it.
I may add that neither side had gone to the hearing with any architects.
If an architect had been called for the city council, Mr Eccles would have
wanted to call an architect on his side.
The inquiry would have been lengthened and made more expensive. In the inspector’s view –
also in the view of Forbes J – this was a matter of ordinary common sense
or aesthetic taste that the inspector could perfectly well handle himself
without the need for any expert evidence.
There was no want of natural justice at all.”
As long ago as 1989 the Environmental
Improvement Plan noted the deterioration in the existing building and its poor
external appearance. It suggested
total remodelling or reconstruction with a high standard of design required. (See paragraph 50 above). We conclude that the Minister did
satisfactorily address these policies.
87. An issue of procedural fairness arises here in
that the application was originally made under the 2002 Plan, which did not
include policies equivalent to E1 and GD2, but as a result of the delays caused
by the procedural irregularities on the part of the former Minister and through
no fault on the part of the applicant, when the application was remitted back
to the Minister, it fell to be dealt with under the 2011 Plan. Even if it could be said that
consideration of Policies E1 and GD2 did require the professional reports
contended for by the appellant, it would be procedurally unfair to require the
applicant to surmount such hurdles now, when they did not exist under the 2002
Plan (see Webb-v-Minister of Planning [2012] JRC 107 at paragraph 10).
88. There were a number of further ancillary points
made by the appellant, such as the alleged need for an Environmental Impact
Assessment and concerns over the constructional depth of the green roof, which
we have considered but in our view none of them render the decision of the
Minister unreasonable. We agree
with Mr Mills that Policy GD5 has no application; that policy is concerned with
protecting the skyline, strategic views, important vistas and the setting of
landmark and listed buildings. The
proposal does not affect or obscure the skyline and the fact that the site is
not in the Shoreline Zone is determinative of the fact that it does not obscure
strategic views or important vistas.
89. Having taken into account all the submissions
made by the appellant, we conclude, applying the Token test, that the
Minister’s decision was reasonable and accordingly this Court has no
grounds to intervene.
90. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Authorities
Planning and Building (Jersey) Law
2002.
Ruette
Pinel Farm Limited-v-Minister for Planning and Environment [2012] JRC 008.
2002 Island Plan.
2011 Island Plan.
Token
Limited-v-Planning and Environment Committee
[2001] JLR 698.
Trump
Holdings Limited-v-Planning and Environment Committee [2004] JLR 232.
Dunn-v-Minister
for Planning and Environment [2009] JRC 237.
1989 Environmental Improvement Plan.
Planning and Building (Application Publication)(Jersey)
Order 2006.
Supplementary Planning Guidance
Practice Note 16.
R-v-North and
East Devon Health Authority Ex P. Coughlan
[2001] QB 213.
B. Johnston & Co (Builders) Limited-v-Minister
of Health [1947] 2 All E.R. 395.
Interface
Management limited and others-v-Jersey Financial Services Commission [2003] JLR 524.
Blackall and Danby Ltd-v-Island
Development Committee [1963] JJ 273.
Castleford homes Ltd-v-Secretary of
State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions and another [2001] All ER
(D) 31.
Bushell and another-v-Secretary of
State for the Environment [1980] 2 All ER 608.
R (Alconbury
Developments Ltd)-v-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and
Regions [2003] 2 AC 295.
Re
the matter of the X Children [2009] JCA 083.
Hobson-v-The
Minister of Planning and Environment [2012]
JRC 200.
Farina-v-Minister
for Planning [2010] JLR Note 30.
Winchester City Council-v-Secretary
of State for the Environment [1980] 39 P. and C.R. 1.
Webb-v-Minister
of Planning [2012] JRC 107.